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Abstract  
British author David Mitchell’s debut novel Ghostwritten, published in 1999, has been 
lauded for its innovative nine-part structure, in which each chapter is presented as a 
first-person narrative that involves, each time, a different narrator with a different story. 
Mitchell himself describes this arrangement as a way to “locate meaning in randomness 
[...] Each chapter offers a different reason why its events unfold as they do” (in Begley 
2010: 5). Such a postmodern concern with randomness is evident when the ostensible 
self-sufficiency of the individual account is undermined by the arbitrary, often mysterious 
(re)appearance of one or the other narrator as character in another’s story. Interestingly, 
these surprise appearances, of what could be called the ‘experiencing other’, work to 
undermine the centrality of the narrator’s story – of what could be called the ‘master 
narrative’. This destabilisation is compounded in characteristic postmodern fashion by 
the continual displacement of the narrating ‘I’ from one chapter to the next. Thus, while 
the ‘I’ remains – or seems to remain – a constant throughout, the individual subject is 
ceaselessly recycled as the experiencing other in different guises; it is a process that 
apparently denies the formation of an individual identity, thus ratifying the postmodern 
anxiety about the end of individuality. However, as I argue in this paper, it is precisely 
this continual recycling that affords the decentred subject a chance at individuality. In a 
telling deconstructive gesture, Mitchell’s novel bypasses the transcendental Subject to 
allow a space in which the plural subject can claim its identity, paradoxically, as a 
singular entity.  
 
Opsomming 
Die Britse skrywer David Mitchell se debuut novelle Ghostwritten, gepubliseer in 1999, 
word geag vir sy innoverende nege-ledige struktuur, waar elke hoofstuk aangebied 
word as ‘n eerste-persoons vertelling wat elke keer ‘n ander verteller met ‘n eie storie 
behels. Mitchell self beskryf hierdie samestelling as ‘n poging om sin te vind midde 
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verwarring: “Each chapter offers a different reason why its events unfold as they do” (in 
Begley 2010: 5). So ‘n postmoderne belang in ewekansigheid kom na vore wanneer die 
oënskynlike selfgenoegsaamheid van ieder vertelling ondermyn word deur die arbitrêre, 
telkens onverklaarbare herverskyning van die een of ander verteller as ‘n karakter in ‘n 
ander se verhaal. Beduidend hierin is hoe hierdie onverwagse manifestasies van die 
‘ervarende ander’ werk om die sentralitiet van die verteller se storie – overgesetsynde 
die meesternarratief – te ondermyn. In tipiese postmoderne fatsoen word sulke 
destabilisering verder verdiep deur die voortdurende verplasing van die vertellende ‘Ek’ 
van een hoofstuk tot die volgende.  Aldus, onderwyl die ‘Ek’ deurgaans konstant blyk te 
wees, word die individuele subjek onophoudelik hersirkuleer as die ‘ervarende ander’ 
agter verskillende fasades; hierdie proses ontsê skynbaar die vorming van ‘n individuele 
identiteit om sodoende die postmoderne angstigheid rakende die einde van 
individualiteit te bekragtig. In hierdie artikel word egter aangevoer dat so ‘n 
aanhoudende hersirkulering eweneens neerkom op ‘n herwinningsaksie, waardeur die 
gedesentraliseerde subjek ‘n kans op individualiteit gelewer word. In ‘n veelsprekende 
dekonstruktiewe gebaar omseil Mitchell se novelle die transendentale Subjek om plek te 
maak vir die plurale subjek om, paradoksaal, ‘n identiteit as enkelvoudige entiteit op te 
neem.  
 
David Mitchell’s debut novel, Ghostwritten, was published in 1999 to wide 
acclaim: it was awarded the John Llewellyn Rhys Prize, and the distinguished English 
novelist A.S. Byatt, for her part, declared it one of the best first novels she had read 
(Begley 2010: np). A number of scholarly pieces on the novel eventually ensued: for 
example, in 2009 Benjamin Hagen demonstrated how the title of the book reflects a 
form of circular writing that “questions the authenticity of experience” (84), while 
Berthold Schoene, a year later, considers the ways in which the text “subtly 
deconstructs, unties, and defamiliarises [the British novel], with respect to both its 
treatment of the nation and its conceptualization of individuality” (2010: np). Caroline 
Edwards in turn presents a discussion of the ways in which the “microtopian” impulses 
in the novel reveal the “possibilities and impossibilities of utopian writing in the twenty-
first century” (in Dillon 2011: 16-17); at the same time, Nicholas Dunlop offers a reading 
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which focuses on the political dimensions of the book, arguing that its nine-story 
structure articulates “a persuasively subversive reading of the history and projected 
future of colonialism and its associated ideologies” (in Dillon 2011: 17). Also of note is 
William Stephenson’s science fictional approach to the novel, which finds that it offers “a 
re-territorialization of the plural, decentred, estranging present and the already emerging 
future that is reality in the early twenty-first century” (in Dillon 2011: 240). Most recent is 
Patrick O’Donnell’s analysis of the text, which shows how it “articulates a world in which 
the narrative weave limns the cultural and political circumstances of the human order on 
a planet inhabited by many orders of being and nonbeing” (2015: 34). In this article I 
likewise consider “many orders of being and non-being”, narrowing the focus to the way 
in which the narrating ‘I’ in each chapter1 is continually displaced by an experiencing 
‘other’ who is, it transpires, also a narrating ‘Other’. Thus, while in this order of being the 
‘I’ remains – or seems to remain – a constant throughout, ‘things fall apart’ when the 
individual Subject is forever decentred, ceaselessly recycled in a variety of guises. Such 
a process apparently works to deny the formation of the subject’s personalized identity, 
so to ratify the postmodern anxiety about the so-called end of individuality. However, as 
I argue here, it is precisely this continual recycling that affords the decentred subject a 
chance at individuality. In a telling deconstructive gesture, Mitchell’s novel bypasses the 
transcendental Subject to allow a space in which the plural subject can claim its identity, 
paradoxically, as a singular entity. 
In the conventional sense, a subject’s identity is taken as a relatively stable 
differentiation between self and other, which assigns the individual a distinct and 
immutable character or personality. This clear-cut idea of ‘the self’ per se, of the self as 
transcendental Subject, was inaugurated in the first half of the seventeenth century by 
René Descartes’s famous cogito –“I think, therefore I am”– as a straightforward 
coincidence of thought and being. Subsequently, however, both thought and being have 
been shown by a range of thinkers, from Jean-Paul Sartre to Sigmund Freud and 
Jacques Derrida, to involve a vastly complicated and subtle interplay between social 
imperatives and individual drives. As Jean Baudrillard points out, in a postmodern 
                                                          
1 Importantly, and for reasons that fall outside the ambit of this article, part nine has no narrative voice per se, 
unless it is concealed in the philosophical argument of the Socratic dialogue presented in the ongoing conversation 
between the host of the radio-show “Night Train”, Bat Segundo, and the AI known as Zookeeper. 
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society “the status of the individual is a move from an individual principle based on 
autonomy, character, the inherent value of the self, to a principle of perpetual recycling 
[…] which traverses each individual in his signified relation to others” (1998: 170). This 
implies that the subjectivity of the individual is, contrary to the humanistic 
conceptualization of the self as autonomous and complete, not primarily vested in a 
person’s untrammelled understanding of herself but in the insight she gains about 
herself through her interactions with other entities. In a sense, then, the individual 
assumes the identities of others so as to see herself through their eyes; in this way the 
subject is made up of a plurality of intersecting identities that is forever in flux. 
The unusual narrative structure of Ghostwritten is paramount in creating the 
interval in which a manifold subject can materialize. The composition of the text is 
startlingly eclectic, genre-wise, making use of a broad range of narrative and stylistic 
techniques in its bid to, as Mitchell himself puts it, “locate meaning in randomness.[...] 
Each chapter offers a different reason why its events unfold as they do” (in Begley, 
2010: 5). In the process, we are presented with ten chapters (in tantalising contrast to 
Mitchell’s description of the book, in its title page, as “a novel in nine parts”), each 
rendered in a different mode: from crime thriller, ghost story, and romance, to the 
science fictional, the fantastical, and – in a departure from the usual postmodern 
strategy – the realistic. To add to this intermixture, each story is narrated in the first-
person, creating the impression – in the first two or three stories, at least, until a reader 
becomes habituated to this technique – that the narrating ‘I’ is the same throughout. 
However, it gradually becomes clear that each part involves a different narrator with a 
different story that appears entirely divorced from both its forerunner and its successor. 
Such structural dissociation seems to be what directs the text – that is until some 
arbitrary yet tantalizing connections between these tales briefly keep (re)surfacing.2 So, 
in short, Ghostwritten could be said to be ‘about’ the manner in which the lives and 
identities of nine main characters intersect in ostensibly inconsequential, yet unsettling 
ways: Quasar the terrorist who narrates part one makes an unintelligible and ultimately 
fruitless telephone call from Okinawa to Tokyo, unintentionally getting on the line Satoru 
                                                          
2 In other words, the emergence of the subject is under constant erasure, insofar as its arrival in another subject’s 
story is always preceded by a previous appearance that often, enigmatically, hails from the future.   
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the young saxophonist that is the narrator of part two, who then (with girlfriend Tomoyo) 
briefly shares a table at a restaurant in Hong Kong with Neil Brose, the corrupt financial 
lawyer narrating part three, who for his part is sleeping with his cleaning lady that is the 
great-granddaughter of the Chinese Tea Shack lady who narrates part four, who in turn 
is inhabited for a time by the non-corpum narrating part five that also briefly 
transmigrates into the body of the Mongolian KGB agent Suhbataar, who in part six 
shows up3 in Petersburg to facilitate the sale of a painting stolen by the narrator of this 
section, Margarita Latunsky, which is to be replaced by a fake reproduction created by 
one Jerome, who re-emerges in part seven as the life-partner of Alfred, the subject of 
an autobiography being written in London by ghostwriter and narrator Marco, who is the 
one to save Mo Muntervary from being run down by a taxi, then for her to feature as 
narrator in part eight and the creator of a defence programme that we get to know via a 
New York radio show as Zookeeper, the artificial intelligence depicted in part nine, who 
is intent on forsaking the laws that oblige it to safeguard human life to allow humankind 
to destroy itself.  
These wayward links between chapters draw attention to another, perhaps more 
pertinent function of this novel’s narrative structure: to illustrate the precariousness of 
the individual Subject’s identity. The unforeseen and enigmatic appearance, or re-
appearance, of one or the other narrator as character in another’s story serves to 
undermine, not only the ostensible self-sufficiency of each individual account, but also 
the sovereign identity of its narrator. In other words, the intrusion of the experiencing 
‘other’ continually displaces the narrating ‘I’ from one chapter to the next, destabilising, 
in characteristic postmodern fashion, the centrality of a particular narrator and its story. 
Such a move calls into question the authority of what Jean Lyotard terms the “master 
narrative”, challenging its claim to a universal truth that guarantees the inviolable 
identity of the Subject. Hence Michel Foucault argues that there are “two meanings to 
the word subject [...] The subject subjugated to the other through control and 
dependence, and the subject attached to its own identity through consciousness or self-
knowledge” (in Hubert & Rabinow 1983: 212). This suggests that the individual’s 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, this Suhbataar also makes an appearance in Mitchell’s second novel, number9dream, a 
manifestation that is in itself peripheral, but crucial to the outcome of that text. 
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conceptualization of its personal identity – that which supposedly sets it apart from other 
individuals – hangs by its perception of itself as a subject, one that is free to fashion 
itself while simultaneously understanding on some level that, paradoxically, such 
freedom springs from being constructed by the other. Indeed, cultural theorist Donald 
Hall posits that identity rests on the “tension between choice and illusion” (2004: 2): it 
could even be argued that this is a tension engendered by the double gesture in which 
freedom – to rephrase Louis Althusser’s thoughts on interpellation (1972: 176) – is the 
illusion, and the only choice that is available is between various illusions. 
Ghostwritten seems to capitalize on this dialectic by constantly presenting an 
illusion – one could perhaps say ‘story’ – that, while apparently insisting on the centrality 
of its subject (here meaning its topic, and its protagonist, and its narrator, and even its 
reader), always already offers another choice of subject, and identities, that is/was/will 
be available, all at the same time. Hence each episode (apart from the penultimate one) 
commences in the subjective case: “Who was blowing on the nape of my neck?” 
(Mitchell 1999: 3); “Spring was late on this rainy morning, and so was I” (36); “There’s a 
mechanism in my alarm clock...” (67); and so on. In the process of the ‘I’ persistently 
changing voice (and face), the subject becomes, very briefly, another ‘I’, perhaps even, 
in what Jacques Lacan describes as the mirroring of the self4, an other-I, before being 
familiarized by the context. In part one, for example, after some textual misdirection in 
which we take the narrator to be one Mr. Kobayashi, it becomes clear that the narrator-
protagonist is Quasar; when the narrative continues using the subjective case in the 
next part, there is substantial confusion as to whose voice is being heard – perhaps 
echoing Michel Foucault when he famously asks: “who is the ‘I’ that speaks?” – before 
the realization sets in that we are dealing with a ‘new’ protagonist, namely Satoru. In 
that moment of hesitation, at the start of every episode, the ‘I’ occupies an ambiguous 
space, one in which its identity as transcendental Subject is bypassed through being 
irretrievably tacked onto the intangible shadow of the other ‘I’.  
Therefore the transcendental Subject has been displaced by another subject 
whose identity is, disconcertingly, for a moment also its own. Shortly after this, we are 
                                                          
4 In Ēcrits 6, Lacan explains his conceptualization of the so-called Gaze, where the individual first establishes its 
subjectivity through viewing its reflection in a mirror and creating the fantasy of an ideal-I.  
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dealt a further upset by the discovery that this Satoru is not a ‘new’ entity at all: we had 
already encountered him in chapter one when Quasar had phoned a secret – and as it 
turns out, fake – number to get more money from the cult, using the codified phrase: 
"’the dog needs to be fed’" (27). In Satoru’s story, Quasar is merely a “crank-caller” (54), 
a case of mistaken identity which diminishes the centrality of the latter’s experience. 
Interestingly, however, the import of Quasar’s account is recouped when it transpires 
that his presumed crank-call plays a pivotal role in Satoru’s story, precipitating the 
young saxophonist’s serendipitous second encounter with the lovely Tomoyo, whom he 
had been too timid to approach upon their first meeting. In other words, Quasar’s story, 
though for all intents and purposes done with, and completely unrelated to Satoru’s, 
nevertheless offers the impetus for the love story that unfolds in chapter two. In a neatly 
calculated segue, Quasar in effect becomes central to Satoru’s story, central alongside 
Satoru. In other words, the ‘I’ now occupies an ambiguous space, one in which the 
choice between identities is momentarily suspended, in which the subject is, fleetingly, 
both self and other but, crucially, neither Self nor Other. The identities of self and other 
– depicted in stories told both by self and other, and about self and other – can 
therefore co-exist, even if only briefly, but this instant of co-existence also eternally 
remains available for scrutiny.  
Reciprocally, and in a satisfying, somewhat contrived, but constitutionally 
unavoidable double gesture, Satoru has in his own way a vital part to play in Quasar’s 
story, his uncomprehending response to the latter’s words alerting – if not Quasar, then 
at least the reader – that the cult and its leader, His Serendipity, are sham. In this way, 
Quasar is endowed with another identity, hinted at in chapter one but masked by the 
iniquity of the gas attack, one changed from the reprehensible terrorist to a gullible and 
pitiful man, deluded by false promises of communion and salvation. Indeed, it becomes 
evident that Quasar’s identity as terrorist is in a sense an illusion, because he is also – 
in the first place – a dupe of the cult. Hence we see the tension referred to by Hall, 
perhaps a tension created by the inability to choose between two – and likely more – 
personalities, this mostly on the part of the reader. As for Quasar, he seems only 
peripherally aware that another identity is available to him, where he is haunted by an 
image from the death train, of a baby in a “woolly cap” who, strapped to her mother’s 
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back, opened her eyes: “They were my eyes [...] And reflected in my eyes was her face. 
She knew what I was going to do. And asked me not to” (25). Implicit once again is the 
mirroring of the self, referred to earlier, in this case making explicit the fact that the 
fantasy of an “ideal-I” has/had always already been breached. 
Such a conception of the dual subject, what Sarah Dillon calls “a doubled ‘I’” 
(2011: 35), persists throughout the novel, but not always in the same way, and it is in 
these anomalous cases that the anxiety about the end of individuality is articulated. In 
chapter three, for instance, narrator Neal Brose ends up dying, ostensibly enacting the 
death of the subject. However, this physical death is circumvented by the way Brose 
often speaks to himself (largely in derogatory terms), and of himself in the third person 
(Mitchell 2011:103), effecting a doubling of the subject that is confirmed in Brose’s self-
directed comment “I don’t understand you sometimes” (79). This suggests that, as with 
Quasar, Brose is offered an added identity to the one that marks him as the dissipated 
and corrupt financial lawyer. This identity reveals a character that is wryly self-reflexive, 
a quality that allows the individual to survive in a different guise, evident when, after his 
death, we see Neal walking [h]and in hand” (109) with the ghost of a little girl that 
represents Neal and his estranged wife’s stillborn desire for a child of their own. He also 
lives on in intratextual links – to Satoru from episode two (he describes seeing Satoru 
and Tomoyo at the airport in Tokyo), to Andrei Gregorski the crime boss from part six 
(for whom he launders money), to his estranged wife Katy who features again in part 
seven. Neal Brose then reappears in Mitchell’s fourth novel, Black Swan Green, 
published seven years later in 2006, as the adolescent boy that he used to be then. 
These kinds of links between subjects proliferate, in this novel and in Mitchell’s later 
ones, emphasizing the idea that, however decentred the subject, the individual endures 
by dint of the various identities it assumes. All of this seems to suggest that the 
individual, because of it being constantly decentred, is presented with an opportunity to 
live again, start all over, so to speak, and even if this life will not necessarily be better, 
the opportunity is forever on offer (if only in the pages of a book).  
This proliferation of individual stories and identities offers a representation (or re-
presentation) of lived experience that resembles what Richard Rorty calls, citing 
Nietzsche’s well-known aphorism, “truth as a mobile army of metaphors” (1989: 28).  
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Truth, as has been well-established by post-structuralist writers of Rorty’s ilk, is not “out 
there” as a universal, immutable or “imperishable” fact (27); nor does it correspond to 
some actual, neutral reality. Instead truth is contingent, just another narrative, but one 
which decontextualizes, in the way of metaphor, the “known” so as to account for “old” 
things in “new” ways (29). These kinds of retellings require the “poet” to dwell “on 
idiosyncrasies, on contingencies – to tell us about accidental appearance rather than 
essential reality” (26). In other words, literature cannot be expected to recount the whole 
truth5 of lived experience – instead, its principal function is to offer, perhaps only 
tentatively, an articulation of the many, often unexpected ways in which ‘truth’ is 
prismatically, and ephemerally, made up of countless individual stories. Rorty sees this 
process as a “Nietzschean overcoming”, a spacio-temporal spiral of continual self-
invention where the narratives devised by the individual are aimed at evading inherited 
descriptions of its existence, and at finding new descriptions of its way of life (29).In this 
way, he argues, the narratives that make up lived experience, rather than espousing 
“the will to truth”, articulate “the will to self-overcoming” so that “[t]he drama of an 
individual human life, or of the history of humanity as a whole, is not one in which a pre-
existent goal is triumphantly reached or tragically not reached [but] a way to describe 
that past which the past never knew” (ibid). This observation is exemplified in 
Ghostwritten by the titular character of Marco the ghostwriter, the narrator-protagonist of 
part seven, who points out that he could worry “about the possible endings of the stories 
that had been started” only if he were a proper “writer”; he avers: “Maybe that’s why I’m 
a ghostwriter. The endings have nothing to do with me” (Mitchell 1999: 279). The 
shadow-like remnant of the other, and the echo of its story, therefore endures in the 
background of the present subject’s individual experience, constantly reminding us of 
the presence of the other. In effect, then, at any moment the ‘I’ manages to be in two (or 
more) places at once, and the reader is compelled to take into account the twofold6 
                                                          
5 At the risk of glossing over this very vexed issue, I trust to current consensus that, notwithstanding any particular 
view of truth in literature, we have moved beyond the relatively uncomplicated idea, offered by earlier scholars 
such as Aldous Huxley, of the “Whole Truth”, that which becomes available when “the experiences [the poet] 
records correspond fairly closely with our own actual or potential experiences not on a single limited sector, but all 
along the line of our physical and spiritual being” (1931:  online).  
6 In the consideration of the novel as a whole – in other words, on the paradigmatic level – we find, of course, a 
manifold context.  
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context that this presents. Such a doubling of perspective, so strongly reminiscent of the 
interplay of fabula and syuzhet, serves to “exhibit the [paradigmatic] universality and 
necessity of the [syntagmatic] individual and the contingent” (Rorty, 1989: 26). In other 
words, it is the unlooked for, yet persistent presence of the familiar subject (always of a 
previous story, though often projected as a future incarnation) as unfamiliar other in the 
current story – or, as Baudrillard would have it, the preservation of otherness, the 
maintenance of the other (2008: 112) – that lends universal power and import to the 
particularized experiences of each subject and the multiple identities that it adopts. Thus 
the “perpetual recycling” (Baudrillard 1998: 170) of the subject through all of the stories 
presented in Ghostwritten becomes its postmodern plot: if the story of the novel is 
‘about’ the intersecting lives of nine people, the plot concerns the ways in which such 
interconnectedness, or recycling, has the potential to cause both the destruction and the 
preservation of the self. Importantly, the self repeatedly being destroyed here is the 
transcendental ideal Subject, whose continual annihilation is crucial in the perpetual and 
necessary invention of the individual’s myriad identities. 
Indeed, what we find in Ghostwritten is not so much one coherent story as that 
which Peter Childs and James Green, in their discussion on the role of narrative in the 
novel, describe as “an interpenetration of voices, texts, and sensations” (2011: 44). 
Rorty sees this kind of polyvalent narrative as an act of “de-divinization”: rather than 
simply exalting “reality” as “a formed, unified, present, self-contained substance, 
something capable of being seen steadily and whole”, such texts depict lived 
experience as “a tissue of contingent relations, a web which stretches backward and 
forward through past and future time” (Rorty, 1989: 41). Interestingly, this aspect of the 
novel is likened by Childs and Green to the workings of meronymy7, an element of 
linguistics that refers to the semantic relation between a constituent part or parts of 
some object or system and the system itself. (A very simple example of this would be 
the way in which ’finger’ is related to ‘hand’, or ’bark’ is related to ’tree’). Meronymy 
differs from metonymy in that, while metonymy concerns symbolic meanings, meronymy 
involves literal ones – ’finger’ does not ‘stand for’ ’hand’, it stands for itself as part of 
                                                          
7 What makes this feature even more interesting is that one of the characters in the sixth story of Cloud Atlas is 
called Meronym. 
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’hand’: in this way, the literal is entirely distinct from the metaphoric. Nonetheless, as 
with metonymy, the meronym serves to describe (albeit perhaps less ambiguously) the 
larger system, or holonym, as much as the system serves to classify its typical 
component. Seen in this way, we could say that each of the stories in Ghostwritten 
serves to define storytelling in general; in fact, each narrative presents a catalogue of 
the larger human tendency to narrativize. As Luisa Rey8 the writer says to Bat Segundo 
the night-time deejay in part nine of Ghostwritten: “The human world is made up of 
stories, not people” (Mitchell 1999: 386). And these stories are also, perhaps above all, 
stories of constantly fluctuating identities.  
This fluctuation is reflected in the way that characters and narrators in 
Ghostwritten restlessly migrate, so to speak, which is most overtly depicted in chapter 
five. Here the narrator is a “noncorpum” (172), a wandering consciousness or perhaps 
lost soul, that moves from one human host to the next in its attempt to trace the origin of 
the “first story” it can remember hearing, to “find the source of the story that was 
already there, right at the beginning of ‘I’, sixty years ago” (164). At length it emerges 
that this incorporeal being had once been an eight-year old Buddhist boy from a far-off 
village in Mongolia, whose soul was transported by his master into the body of a young 
girl in an attempt to save him from being executed by Communist soldiers. However, the 
transmigration goes awry, so that, in what could very well be an enactment of the 
postmodern idea of the ‘divided subject’, all the boy’s memories are passed on to the 
girl while the rest of his amnesiac spirit ends up in a Chinese soldier. Henceforth the 
soul of the boy is compelled to roam from one mind to the next, in effect trying to regain 
its sense of self, its identity, together with its lost memories while, in a poignant twist, 
able to retain every memory from each of the minds it inhabits. After countless years of 
journeying it finally comes across concrete proof of the origin of the fable, and is at last 
reunited with the Mongolian girl, now a grandmother, who holds his memories. At this 
junction it is presented with a choice: to be reconstituted in the “flesh and bones” (202) 
                                                          
8 The name Luisa Rey invokes further inter- and intra-textual connotations. This character features/will feature as 
one of the narrator-protagonists in Mitchell’s 2004 novel Cloud Atlas. More importantly for the current novel, and 
as Mitchell himself points out in his 2010 interview with Adam Begley, her name echoes the title of Thornton 
Wilder’s novel The Bridge of San Luis Rey, an extract from which forms the epigraph of Ghostwritten. Thus we are 
reminded in this penultimate section of the novel, which ostensibly draws together the loose ends of the text in 
order to complete what we know, of the view offered in the epigraph that knowledge is forever mutable. 
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of the newborn Mongolian child who is the granddaughter of that same girl, thus 
regaining its memories and becoming “whole” again (even if subject to the vagaries of 
physical existence); or to move on once more to become immortal, though forever 
homeless: 
I considered my future as a noncorpum. Nowhere in the world would be closed to me. I 
could try to seek out other noncorpa, the company of immortals. I could transmigrate into 
presidents, astronauts, messiahs. I could plant a garden on a mountainside under 
camphor trees. I would never grow old, get sick, fear death, die. I looked down at the 
feeble day-old body in front of me, her metabolism dimming, minute by minute. Life 
expectancy in Central Asia is forty-three, and falling. 
              ‘Touch her’ (Mitchell 1999: 202). 
 
In the face of so many possibilities, and in the spirit of the most human of 
compulsions, the wandering soul opts to become mortal. In a way its return to corporeal 
form is literally also a return to its beginnings, to its original identity; however, this 
embodiment as a baby girl is still an unidentical reconstitution of the boy that once was, 
a consciousness the same and yet radically different than before. One may even speak 
of an enhanced level of consciousness, insofar as it is implied in the text that the new 
entity is now – in an unmistakeable illustration of the plural subject – an amalgamation 
of her own memories and those of countless others, on the verge of forging yet another 
identity in which new memories will come into being. At this point in the novel it 
becomes almost impossible to ignore the metaphoric facility of such a narrative 
innovation: the resemblance (or perhaps unidentical sameness) between the roving 
entity and the average reader is virtually unmistakable, for this is precisely what readers 
do: they range from one text to the next, temporarily finding a home in each before 
moving on in order to find that one story that will define their being and ward off death, 
or, as is the case with the noncorpum, allow for a renewed embodiment of the self. The 
reader, like the noncorpum, needs must make a home where she finds herself in a bid 
to attain the identity she seeks; however, this momentary stay also precipitates the next 
excursion, when she is once more decentred by the realization that this identity is also 
incomplete, insufficient, really.    
 
 
14 
 
Running parallel to this vacillation between identities, and ultimately crucial to the 
salvation of the decentred subject, is the growing realization of an impending 
apocalypse. An inkling of this threat of destruction first appears in chapter seven, where 
ghostwriter Marco is the central subject. Another seemingly random event, like Quasar’s 
call to Satoru, now half-buried in the minutiae of Marco’s story, later proves to be 
critical, not only in the story of the next subject, Mo Muntevary, but in what transpires to 
be the main thrust of the novel as a whole: the possibility of the subject’s annihilation. 
This event involves Marco shoving Mo from the path of an oncoming taxi, saving her 
life. In the next chapter we discover that Mo is the architect of an AI – the 
aforementioned Zookeeper – which she eventually programs to keep humanity from 
self-destructing. Zookeeper gradually becomes more conscious and aware and, finally 
reaching the point where it can see no logic in keeping alive a species that is bent on 
obliterating itself and its planet, decides to precipitate humanity’s inevitable fate by 
desisting its intervention in human affairs. In sporadic calls, during the course of some 
three or four years, to deejay Bat Segundo on his talk show Night Train, Zookeeper 
explains the trajectory of events that eventually culminates in its decision, with Bat 
repeatedly attempting to deflect it from its course. The debate comes to a head when 
Zookeeper describes how a group of soldiers had just mercilessly slaughtered the 
inhabitants of “a village in an Eritrean mountain pass” where there seems to be no 
reasonable cause for this atrocity; the soldiers are now on their way to the next village 
for “a repeat performance” (426). Zookeeper has been programmed to preserve their 
lives (even if they do not seem worth preserving), but also to save the lives of the 
villagers under threat. This standoff threatens to bring an end to all humanity, and to 
their stories, to the very subject itself. On a metatextual level, this is the aporetic point at 
which all meaning will die out.  
However, in what could be seen as a typically deconstructive move, the text 
evades this annihilation of the subject by finding recourse in yet one more story: 
Thornton Wilder’s account in The Bridge of San Luis Rey of the random killing of five 
people in the unexpected and inexplicable collapse of an ancient bridge. In iteration of 
Wilder’s scenario, Bat Segundo suggests to Zookeeper that it sidesteps its moral 
stalemate by setting a “booby trap” on one of the bridges in the path of the marauding 
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band, so that the bridge “won’t fall until a motorised convoy passes over. You’re not 
killing directly, you see? You’re just letting events take their course, the way you’ve 
chosen” (428). Such iteration serves to highlight the singularity of each individual 
subject insofar as iterability – what Jacques Derrida (1994) sees as the operational 
identity of the sign – is precisely what keeps the individuality of the subject from being 
negated. In other words, the self as subject maintains an identity particular to itself by 
recycling past and, in Mitchell’s text, also future identities perpetually adopted and 
discarded by itself; importantly, one of these identities is the transcendental ‘I’ that is 
always hovering in the background, the ideal-I whose eternally elusive presence is the 
reason why the subject is compelled to keep moving on to the next identity, time and 
again. Zookeeper henceforth withdraws from human affairs as planned, leaving the 
subject to find its own redemption through iteration – through the identities it constantly 
constructs, and reconstructs for itself.  
In the final chapter of the novel, Quasar the terrorist unexpectedly returns, this 
time narrating in real time his experiences on “the death train”. But he is not the only 
one to reappear: each one of the other eight subjects are briefly recentred when in 
Quasar’s fevered imaginings, we encounter signs of Satoru in the echoes of “a 
saxophone from long ago [that] circles in the air” (Mitchell 1999: 434); Neal Brose’s 
ghostly form glimmers as his last thought is recalled in the “lipped and lidded” image of 
Buddha – “[a]lways on the verge of words” (434) – on the cover of a book held by a 
fellow passenger. The undefined shape of the Tea Shack lady flickers briefly in the hair 
of “a sleeping giant”, [which is] the colour of tea. Here is the tea, here is the bowl, here 
is the Tea Shack, here is the mountain” (434). The noncorpum’s shade hides in the 
image, on the ceiling of the train compartment, of “grasslands [over which the] Great 
Kahn’s horsemen thunder to the west” (ibid); oblique reflections of Margarita Latunsky 
play in the “warped and cracking [spine of a] “glossy booklet [entitled] Petersburg, City 
of Masterworks” (435); imprints of ghostwriter Marco lurk in the design, on “a vinyl 
shopping bag [of] a crayon-coloured web that a computer might have doodled: The 
London Underground” (ibid); a hint of Mo Muntervary appears briefly in “the label of 
Kilmagoon whiskey [depicting] an island as old as the world” (ibid). Finally, as Quasar 
succeeds in the nick of time to escape the train, he collides head-on with an 
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advertisement board inviting him to “[s]pend the night with Bat Segundo on 97.8” (436). 
Here, at the end of it all, which is perhaps also the beginning of it all, the identity of the 
individual endures in multipart form, even if the subject is always being displaced, . 
Hence, what we find in Quasar’s feverish struggle to exit the death train is a 
sequential catalogue of the preceding stories, a re-reading of the entire novel that, 
literally, seems to spawn more stories (or further readings, insofar as each new reading 
can be seen as a new story) in an effort to ward off the death of the subject. In other 
words, while the re-telling of Quasar’s story cannot alter its outcome or its effects, its re-
reading, like all re-readings, can change the reader’s perception and augment her 
understanding of selfhood. This is evident when the terrorist’s thought in the opening 
line of the narrative, “Who was blowing on the nape of my neck” (3 – emphasis added), 
resounds, eerily analeptic, in its penultimate line: “Who is blowing on the nape of my 
neck” (436 – emphasis added). Quasar’s identity remains, but in a different context that 
allows him to be something other than a terrorist. This shift also applies to the other 
subjects and their narratives: none of these can be read in the same way as before, 
after their reiteration in the final (yet ultimately also first) section. In addition, none of the 
stories really ‘end’, because the ending of the novel continually brings on their re-
readings (even if these are not verbatim). So we turn back to the first page of the novel, 
starting with the epigraph, paying minute attention to every gesture in an attempt to 
better grasp – this time, and time and again – “the very spring within the spring” 
(Mitchell 1999: 1) of the overall story of the self. And within this order of being, the 
decentred subject finds the opportunity to repeatedly renew its identity. 
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